

## **BETWEEN WAR AND DIPLOMACY (1913–1923): GREEK MILITARY PEDAGOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREEK ARMY FROM THE TREATY OF NEUILLY TO THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE**

**Dr. Marios Kyriakidis**

Docent at the Hellenic Army Academy, Higher Military Educational Institution "Military Academy of Evelpidon", Greece

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### **ABSTRACT**

This manuscript examines Greece's transformative journey from the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), highlighting the interplay of military pedagogy, the evolution of the Greek army, and the role of diplomacy. Following its significant territorial gains in the Balkan Wars, Greece sought to consolidate its position through diplomacy and later navigated the challenges of World War I, including the National Schism between Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine I. The Treaty of Neuilly (1919) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) marked the apex of Greece's territorial ambitions, driven by Venizelos's diplomatic acumen. However, the Asia Minor Campaign (1919–1922) exposed the limits of military overreach and internal division, culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which redefined Greek sovereignty and population demographics. This study explores how military modernization, strategic leadership, and diplomatic resilience shaped Greece's national trajectory, offering broader insights into state-building and regional influence in a volatile era.

**Keywords:** Greek diplomacy, Greek army, military pedagogy, Treaty of Neuilly, Treaty of Sèvres, Treaty of Lausanne, National Schism, Eleftherios Venizelos, King Constantine I, Balkan Wars, Asia Minor, state-building, territorial expansion.

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

The period from 1913 to 1922 was one of profound transformation for Greece, defined by significant territorial expansions, dramatic military campaigns, and the consequences of deep political divisions. Emerging from the Balkan Wars, Greece secured considerable territorial gains through the Treaty of Bucharest and the Peace Convention of Athens in 1913, nearly doubling its size and population. These treaties not only reinforced Greece's position in the Balkans but also marked a milestone in the realization of the Megali Idea—the vision of uniting all Greek-speaking peoples within a single state.

The Greek army, rebuilt and modernized after its defeat in 1897, played a pivotal role during this transformative decade. Its successes in the Balkan Wars underscored the importance of military pedagogy, emphasizing professional training, tactical innovation, and leadership development. This modernization effort, which had been initiated in the early 20th century with foreign military missions and advanced weaponry, continued throughout this period, shaping Greece's military engagements. However, the Asia Minor Campaign exposed the limits of these reforms, revealing the challenges of sustaining military effectiveness in the face of logistical difficulties, overstretched resources, and political turmoil.

Diplomacy also emerged as a cornerstone of Greece's successes and failures. Under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos, Greece positioned itself as a key player on the international stage, securing its territorial expansions through the Treaty of Neuilly (1919) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). Venizelos's diplomatic acumen was instrumental in aligning Greece with the Allied Powers during World War I, enhancing its geopolitical leverage. However, the political schism between Venizelos and King Constantine I—known as the National Schism—profoundly impacted Greece's trajectory. This division weakened the nation's internal cohesion, complicating its military campaigns and undermining its diplomatic standing.

By 1922, the ambitious territorial and political gains achieved earlier in the decade were overshadowed by the catastrophic defeat in the Asia Minor Campaign, culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. This treaty redrew the borders of Greece, marking the end of the Greco-Turkish War and the abandonment of the Megali Idea. The National Schism, combined with shifting international alliances and the resurgence of Turkish nationalism under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, sealed Greece's defeat.

This period underscores the interplay of military pedagogy, army modernization, and diplomatic strategy in shaping Greece's trajectory. It highlights how internal divisions, geopolitical pressures, and the limits of military and diplomatic capabilities can transform a nation's fortunes within a decade. By examining this era, we gain insight into the broader dynamics of state-building, military strategy, and the enduring challenges of national unity in times of crisis.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Theoretical framework**

The period from 1913 to 1923 represents a critical phase in Modern Greek history, where the intersection of military pedagogy, diplomatic strategy, and national aspirations shaped the trajectory of the Greek state. This theoretical framework draws upon concepts of state-building, military modernization, and diplomacy within the broader context of geopolitical competition and national identity formation.

The concept of state-building is central to understanding this period, as Greece sought to consolidate its territorial gains and integrate diverse populations into a unified national entity. The expansion of Greek territory through the Treaties of Neuilly (1919), and Sèvres (1920) following the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) necessitated not only administrative reforms but also the alignment of these new territories with the cultural and political ethos of the Greek state.

This alignment was deeply rooted in the Megali Idea, the irredentist vision that aimed to unite all Greek-speaking peoples within a single nation-state. The pursuit of this vision shaped Greek foreign policy and military strategy, influencing Greece's alliances and its involvement in major conflicts, such as World War I and the Asia Minor Campaign. Theoretical perspectives on nationalism and identity formation provide valuable insights into the challenges Greece faced in reconciling its ambitions with the realities of governance, population diversity, and regional geopolitics.

The modernization of the Greek military was a defining feature of this period, serving as both a practical necessity and a symbol of national progress. After the humiliating defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, Greece embarked on a series of reforms that transformed its army into a professional and effective force. The influence of foreign military missions, particularly from France, played a crucial role in introducing modern training methodologies, organizational structures, and advanced weaponry.

Theoretical frameworks on military pedagogy and professionalization are essential to understanding how Greece's armed forces evolved during this period. These frameworks highlight the importance of leadership development, tactical innovation, and the integration of new technologies in shaping military effectiveness. However, the Asia Minor Campaign revealed the limits of these reforms, particularly in the face of logistical challenges, overextension, and political interference.

The role of the military extended beyond battlefield success. It was also a tool for fostering national unity and projecting state power. The army's ability to integrate recruits from newly acquired territories and its symbolic association with the Megali Idea underscored its dual function as both a military and political institution.

Diplomacy was a cornerstone of Greece's successes and failures during this transformative decade. Eleftherios Venizelos, as the architect of Greece's foreign policy, leveraged diplomatic alliances to secure territorial gains and international recognition. Theoretical approaches to diplomacy, including coalition-building, soft power, and balance of power strategies, provide a lens through which to analyze Venizelos's achievements.

The alignment with the Allied Powers during World War I was a masterstroke of strategic diplomacy, positioning Greece to gain territories in Thrace and Asia Minor through the Treaty of Sèvres. However, the diplomatic landscape shifted dramatically in the postwar period, with the emergence of Turkish nationalism under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the waning support of Greece's allies. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which reversed many of Greece's earlier gains, underscores the fragility of diplomatic victories in the absence of sustained support and internal unity.

The National Schism between Venizelos and King Constantine I represents a critical dimension of this period. This political and ideological divide, rooted in disagreements over Greece's alignment in World War I, had far-reaching implications for the nation's military and diplomatic efforts. Theoretical perspectives on leadership, political polarization, and civil-military relations help to elucidate how the schism undermined Greece's cohesion and strategic effectiveness.

Finally, Greece's trajectory during this period must be understood within the broader geopolitical context of the early 20th century. The decline of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of nationalist movements in the Balkans and Anatolia, and the shifting alliances among great powers created both opportunities and challenges for Greece. Theories of regional geopolitics and power dynamics shed light on how Greece navigated this complex environment, balancing its ambitions against the constraints imposed by external forces.

## **2.2 Research studies on the period under investigation (1913–1923) towards Neuilly to Lausanne**

The decade between the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) represents a highly transformative period for Greece. It encompasses the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, Greece's role in World War I, the Asia Minor Campaign, and the population exchange following the Treaty of Lausanne. This multifaceted period has drawn scholarly attention from various disciplines, including history, political science, military studies, and international relations. While significant research exists, notable gaps remain, particularly in addressing the interconnected themes of Greek military pedagogy, the role of the Greek army, and the diplomacy of the era.

A significant body of literature focuses on the diplomatic efforts of Eleftherios Venizelos (Kitromilides, 2008) and the broader geopolitical context of the period. Studies emphasize

Venizelos's role in aligning Greece with the Allies during World War I, his participation in the Paris Peace Conference (1919), and his ability to secure territorial gains through the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). Key works examine Greece's territorial ambitions under the Megali Idea and Venizelos's pragmatic approach to balancing alliances (Pollis, 1958), particularly with Britain and France. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) has been analyzed as a pivotal turning point, marking the end of Greek territorial expansion and symbolizing the consequences of overextension during the Asia Minor Campaign (Tusan, 2023).

Research on the Greek military during this period highlights the army's transformation following the reforms initiated after the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 (Kyriakidis, 2021). Scholars have documented the modernization of the Greek army, its successes in the Balkan Wars (Gerolymatos, 2003), and its role in World War I and the Asia Minor Campaign (HRH Prince Andrew, 1930). Case studies of battles such as Kilkis-Lahanas (1913) and the Gallipoli Campaign (1915) emphasize tactical developments and the importance of military leadership (Hall, 2000). The Asia Minor Campaign is a recurring focus, with analyses of its logistical challenges, strategic miscalculations, and eventual collapse in 1922.

The National Schism between Venizelos and King Constantine I has been extensively studied, with scholars examining its roots, evolution, and impact on Greece's military and diplomatic efforts. Researchers have explored how the Schism undermined national cohesion, disrupted military operations, and weakened Greece's diplomatic standing during critical moments (Kyriakidis, 2023).

The Treaty of Lausanne's provisions for a compulsory population exchange have been widely analyzed, particularly its impact on national identity, social integration, and the demographic composition of Greece and Turkey. Studies often focus on the human cost of the exchange, the experiences of refugees, and the long-term implications for both nations. The Lausanne population exchange, as analyzed in works (Hirschon, 2003), highlights the importance of this treaty in reshaping Greek identity through demographic and territorial reconfigurations.

While significant work has been done on both military and diplomatic aspects of the period, few studies integrate these themes to examine how Greece's military reforms influenced its diplomatic strategies and vice versa. For instance, the interplay between Venizelos's diplomatic achievements and the army's modernization has not been fully explored. How military successes (or failures) shaped diplomatic negotiations, and how diplomacy informed military strategy, remains an underdeveloped area. Research on the Greek military often highlights structural reforms and leadership but rarely delves into the educational and pedagogical aspects of these changes. The influence of foreign military missions (e.g., the French mission) on the Greek military's educational frameworks, the adoption of modern doctrines, and the training of officers and soldiers is insufficiently documented. The role of military education in fostering national unity and supporting the Megali Idea is another overlooked dimension. Much attention is given to the major treaties of the era, such as Neuilly, Sèvres, and Lausanne. These treaties provide essential context for understanding the transitions between the Balkan Wars and World War I and their impact on subsequent developments.

The Asia Minor Campaign has been studied extensively, but much of the literature focuses on specific battles or the campaign's political consequences. Sir Michael Llewellyn Smith, in his work (Sir Llewellyn, 1973), addresses Greece's Asia Minor campaign and its overreach, yet the analysis often isolates the military events from the diplomatic backdrop. Comprehensive analyses that combine military strategy, logistical challenges, and the socio-political implications of the

campaign are rare. Additionally, the role of the Greek navy in the campaign and its impact on controlling sea routes and supporting operations is underrepresented.

While the National Schism's political and diplomatic implications have been explored, its direct effects on the Greek army's cohesion, morale, and operational effectiveness remain understudied. How the Schism influenced recruitment, promotions, and decision-making within the army has not been adequately addressed. Most studies focus exclusively on Greece, with limited comparative analyses of how Greece's experiences during this period paralleled or diverged from those of neighboring countries like Serbia, Bulgaria, or Turkey. Comparative approaches could offer insights into shared challenges and strategies among emerging nation-states in the post-Ottoman Balkans. The period from 1913 to 1923 is rich with historical significance, yet significant gaps remain in the literature. A more integrated approach that connects military pedagogy, army modernization, and diplomacy could provide a holistic understanding of Greece's trajectory during this transformative decade. Addressing these gaps would not only deepen our understanding of this critical period in Greek history but also contribute to broader discussions on state-building, military modernization, and the interplay of war and diplomacy in shaping national identity.

### 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Research methodology

The research methodology is designed to align with the nature of the material and the study's objectives, employing a historical-pedagogical framework enriched with in-depth source analysis. Focusing on the intersections of diplomacy, military education, and the role of the Greek armed forces in shaping modern Greek history, this study examines the following key areas:

- a) The evolution of Greek military education, including institutional frameworks and the organization of military training.
- b) The development of educational standards in diplomacy and political strategy.
- c) An assessment of political challenges during pivotal periods, including conflicts, territorial negotiations, and the shifting agendas of major powers.
- d) A critique of strategic planning and the educational systems of the time.
- e) Historical analysis of policies shaping military and political education (Borg & Gall, 1989).

This qualitative approach delves into diplomatic challenges in modern Greek history, emphasizing treaties that bolstered the stability of the Greek state. The study utilizes primary archival sources to investigate periods of risk and uncertainty marked by shifting alliances and the interplay of Great Power interests. D. Mavroskoufis categorizes sources into primary, originating directly from the era under study, and secondary, comprising later analyses and interpretations (Mavroskoufis, 2005).

Addressing both theoretical and practical dimensions, the research confronts challenges inherent in studying incomplete historical records and interpreting long-past events (Verdi, 2015; Athanasiou, 2003). It seeks answers to complex historical questions, echoing Jaspers' philosophy that modern science is rooted in an ongoing quest for understanding (Jaspers, 1950).

The primary method is historical analysis, focusing on uncovering facts, evaluating evidence, and establishing chronological sequences (Mialaret, 1999). This method explores causality, consequences, and the societal attitudes and institutions of various periods (Athanasiou, 2003). Cohen and Manion describe historical research as "the systematic and objective identification, evaluation, and synthesis of evidence" to reconstruct the past critically (Cohen & Manion, 1977). This approach serves to interpret the past, clarify the present, and anticipate future developments (Nova-Kaltsouni, 2006).

The interplay of primary and secondary sources enriches this study (Cohen & Manion, 1977). Hill and Kerber highlight the benefits of historical research, such as:

- a) Resolving modern issues by drawing from historical insights.
- b) Identifying and interpreting historical trends.
- c) Unveiling the dynamics of cultural interactions and exchanges.
- d) Refining and reevaluating established theories (Hill & Kerber, 1967).

The research investigates international treaties, protocols, and conventions from the 20th century that contributed to Greece's territorial consolidation and stability after centuries under Ottoman domination. It aims to provide a nuanced understanding of societal interactions and risks during times of shifting alliances and competing national interests (Verdi, 2015).

In the realm of education and training, historical research underscores the significance of understanding historical contexts and their interconnectedness with politics, education, and society (Nova-Kaltsouni, 2006). It revisits and reconstructs historical theories to derive insights that are applicable to present and future contexts. The primary objectives include:

1. Extracting lessons applicable to current and future challenges.
2. Revealing historical events, ideologies, and their societal implications.
3. Applying the philosophies of influential thinkers to contemporary scenarios (Bitsaki, 2005; Melanitou, 1957).

Ultimately, this research transcends mere documentation of historical facts, aspiring to illuminate critical issues such as state sovereignty, peace, and the balance between diplomacy and military education. It highlights the transformative role of military education in fostering national identity and contributing to the processes of state-building.

## 4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### 4.1 Heading towards the First World War: Greece's Important Contribution and the National Schism

The period following the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) marked a pivotal phase in the evolution of Greece's military and its educational frameworks. With significant territorial acquisitions and the prospect of further conflicts, Greece faced the dual challenges of maintaining an effective military presence and integrating the newly annexed regions. Military pedagogy and reforms during this time were instrumental in shaping the Hellenic Army into a modern and professional force capable of addressing these challenges.

The decisive victories of the Balkan Wars revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the Greek military. While the army demonstrated courage and strategic acumen, its organization, logistics, and training highlighted the need for substantial reform. Recognizing these gaps, Greece initiated widespread changes aimed at modernizing its armed forces. The military command was restructured to establish a more centralized and efficient chain of command. This included the introduction of modern bureaucratic systems for logistics, troop movements, and resource allocation. Emphasis was placed on integrating new technologies, such as artillery and machine guns, which had proven critical during the Balkan Wars.

Greece invited foreign military missions, most notably from France, to assist in reorganizing its armed forces. French officers played a crucial role in reforming the training programs, improving discipline, and introducing contemporary tactical doctrines. These missions ensured that Greek

officers were exposed to advanced European military practices, fostering a culture of professionalism within the ranks.

The reformation of Greece's military educational institutions was a cornerstone of post-Balkan War military development. Recognizing that effective leadership and discipline were essential for a modern army, the government prioritized the training of officers and enlisted personnel. Institutions like the "Evelpidon Military Academy" were expanded and restructured to offer more rigorous and comprehensive training programs. These programs included theoretical studies in strategy, military history, and engineering, alongside practical field exercises. Foreign instructors and updated curricula ensured that cadets received a world-class education, aligning their skills with contemporary military standards. The conscription system was overhauled to ensure that all eligible males received basic military training. This policy aimed to create a pool of trained reservists who could be mobilized quickly in times of need.

Conscription laws were also used as a tool for nation-building, fostering a sense of unity and shared identity among citizens from diverse regions. While Venizelos was the visionary and architect behind many of these reforms, the success of Greece's military modernization was a collaborative effort involving King Constantine I's battlefield leadership, foreign advisors' expertise, and the dedication of Greek military institutions. The interplay between Venizelos's diplomatic acumen and King Constantine's military experience defined Greece's military transformation during this critical period. However, Venizelos's strategic vision and focus on aligning military reforms with broader state-building goals placed him at the forefront of this transformative era (Kyriakidis, 2023).

World War I began in 1914 due to a complex web of political, economic, and military tensions among Europe's great powers, compounded by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary (Howard, 2007). Nationalism, imperial competition, and a system of entangled alliances (Triple Entente: France, Russia, Britain vs. Triple Alliance: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) created a volatile environment. The war quickly escalated into a global conflict as nations sought to defend their interests and allies.

Greece's strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Mediterranean made it a valuable asset to the warring factions. The Entente Powers (Britain, France, and Russia) sought Greece's involvement to secure critical supply routes, control the Aegean, and counter Central Powers' influence in the Balkans. Greece's potential contribution of troops and resources was also significant. However, Greece's internal division between pro-Entente Venizelos and neutralist King Constantine I complicated its participation in the war. England ardently desired Greece's participation in the war (Leon, 1990) and did not hesitate to cede Cyprus, Northern Epirus, and Smyrna in Asia Minor in order to convince the Greeks.

Venizelos advocated for Greece's active participation in World War I on the side of the Entente Powers (Britain, France, and Russia). He believed aligning with the Entente would serve Greece's territorial ambitions, particularly in Asia Minor and the Balkans, by securing the support of powerful allies. King Constantine I, influenced by his education in Germany and personal ties to Kaiser Wilhelm II (his brother-in-law), favored neutrality, with a tilt toward the Central Powers. He argued that Greece should avoid entering the war to preserve its stability and resources. The divide led to repeated conflicts between the monarchy and the parliamentary government. Venizelos's resignation and subsequent return to power highlighted the instability and contested authority in governance. Greece, however, refused the British proposal with an official communiqué on 28/3/1915, due to the neutral and pro-German stance of King Constantine I.

The schism split Greece into two camps: the Venizelists, who supported the Prime Minister's policies, and the Royalists, loyal to the King. This division permeated all aspects of Greek society, including the military. The army became polarized along political lines, with recruits and officers often identified as either Venizelist or Royalist. This division undermined the unity and cohesion of the armed forces. In regions controlled by Venizelos's provisional government (based in Thessaloniki after 1916), recruitment efforts were geared toward supporting the Entente and aligning with Venizelist objectives. Conversely, Royalist strongholds were less inclined to support active recruitment efforts for the war. Promotions and assignments became heavily influenced by political affiliations. Venizelos and his administration prioritized officers loyal to the Entente and the Venizelist cause, while Royalists favored officers who aligned with the King's neutrality stance (Mavrogordatos, 2015). This politicization of the officer corps led to mistrust and weakened the effectiveness of the military, as decisions were often based on political loyalty rather than merit or strategic necessity.

Frustrated by the King's obstruction, Venizelos established a provisional government in Thessaloniki in 1916, aligning it with the Entente Powers. This move effectively split Greece into two competing governments, with separate military forces and administrative structures. The Entente Powers, particularly France and Britain, pressured Greece to join the war on their side (Kyriakidis, 2021).

Meanwhile, Turkey and Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Triple Alliance. The Entente Powers supported Venizelos's provisional government, providing military and logistical aid. In 1917, the Entente forced King Constantine I to abdicate in favor of his son, Alexander, who was more amenable to Venizelos's policies. This allowed Greece to unify under Venizelos's leadership and officially enter the war on the side of the Entente. Greece's contribution to the Entente in World War I was crucial both strategically and militarily. Positioned at the crossroads of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece offered the Allies a key strategic base. The port of Thessaloniki became the epicenter of the Macedonian Front (Salonika Front), enabling the Entente to exert pressure on the Central Powers in southeastern Europe.

Following Greece's official entry into the war in 1917, its modernized army, reorganized under Eleftherios Venizelos's leadership, played a pivotal role in key operations, such as the Vardar Offensive (1918), which led to the collapse of Bulgaria and the opening of the Balkan Front. Greece also contributed significant manpower, logistical support, and resources to the Allied campaign.

By securing regional stability and aiding the Entente's operations, Greece's involvement proved vital to tipping the balance in favor of the Allies in the closing stages of the war.

#### **4.2 The Treaty of Neuilly (1919)**

On 17/30 October 1918, the Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Entente and Turkey at the British naval base of Agamemnon, marking the cessation of hostilities between the Entente and Turkey. The First World War had ended. The terms of the Mudros armistice fragmented the Ottoman Empire. However, these terms were either poorly implemented or not implemented at all due to competition and the interests of the Allied Powers. This climate favored the gradual reorganization of the Turkish army. With Bulgaria's capitulation following its defeat in World War I, Venizelos demanded the annexation of Western Thrace. England and France were in agreement, while the United States and Italy were opposed. After much diplomatic pressure, and with the Greek military's superiority, the result was the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly on 14 November 1919 (Kyriakidis, 2021).



The Treaty of Neuilly was one of the treaties of the Versailles Settlement, which ended World War I. It was signed on November 27, 1919, in the town of Neuilly-sur-Seine in France, between Bulgaria and the Allied Powers. This treaty was one of the agreements that restructured Europe after the war, heavily impacting Bulgaria's territorial integrity, economy, and political sovereignty. Bulgarian historians described the treaty as the second national disaster of Bulgaria, following the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), which was signed after the Second Balkan War and considered the first national disaster for the country. The Treaty of Neuilly (1919) consisted of 13 parts, containing a total of 296 articles (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 1919).

Part I (Articles 1-26) contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, outlining Bulgaria's obligations to adhere to the League.

Part II (Articles 27–32) defines Bulgaria's borders with neighboring countries (e.g., Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia).

Part III (Articles 33–59) addresses territorial cessions, nationality, minority rights, and bilateral agreements with Greece, Serbia, and others.

Part IV (Articles 60–78) imposes military restrictions on Bulgaria, including limiting its army to 20,000 troops.

Part V (Articles 79–86) covers the release of prisoners of war and arrangements for war graves.

Part VI (Articles 87–122) stipulates Bulgaria's reparations payments to the Allied Powers.

Part VII (Articles 123–124) regulates trade, access to ports, railways, and the treatment of foreign nationals.

Part VIII (Articles 144–160) outlines financial obligations, currency, and property settlements.

Part IX (Articles 161–167) details Bulgaria's restrictions on military aviation and its participation in international air agreements.

Part X (Articles 168–186) addresses navigation and transport along rivers and international railways.

Part XI (Articles 187–195) includes provisions from the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Part XII (Articles 196–202) establishes enforcement mechanisms for compliance with the treaty.

Part XIII (Articles 203–296) outlines the ratification process and implementation details.

Each article and section addressed specific issues resulting from Bulgaria's defeat in World War I, aiming to reshape its borders, limit its power, and integrate it into the post-war order. The parts and articles of the Treaty of Neuilly (1919) specifically addressing Greece are primarily found in Part II and Part III.

Part II in Article 27(2) defines the new frontier between Bulgaria and Greece, following watersheds and other geographic markers: "From the point defined above eastwards to the point where it leaves the watershed between the basins of the Mesta-Karasu on the south and the Maritsa (Marica) on the north near point 1587 (Dibikli), the frontier of 1913 between Bulgaria and Greece." Bulgaria ceded Western Thrace to Greece, effectively cutting off its access to the Aegean Sea.

Part III, in Section II, Article 42, states that Bulgaria renounces all rights over territories ceded to Greece: "Bulgaria renounces in favour of Greece all rights and title over the territories of the Bulgarian Monarchy situated outside the frontiers of Bulgaria as laid down in Article 27, Part II

(Frontiers of Bulgaria), and recognised by the present Treaty, or by any Treaties concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement, as forming part of Greece.”

In Article 43, a commission of seven members (five from the Allied Powers, one from Greece, and one from Bulgaria) will trace the Bulgaria-Greece frontier on the ground. In Article 44, Bulgarian nationals in ceded territories automatically become Greek citizens, except those who moved there after January 1, 1913, who require Greek permits to gain citizenship.

In Article 45, Bulgarian nationals in territories assigned to Greece have two years to opt for Bulgarian nationality. Those who do must relocate to Bulgaria but can retain immovable property in Greece. In Article 46, Greece agrees to protect minorities in its newly acquired territories and ensure freedom of transit and equitable trade treatment for other nations.

Article 47 specifies that Greece will assume a portion of Bulgaria’s financial obligations for the ceded territories. Other relevant parts are found in Part VI, which addresses reparations. Although not explicitly about Greece, Bulgaria’s reparations may include obligations to compensate for damages to Greece as an Allied Power.

Part IX likely includes provisions about Bulgarian access to Greek ports and trade routes, given the loss of direct access to the Aegean Sea.

The Treaty of Neuilly (1919) significantly benefited Greece by solidifying its territorial and geopolitical position in the Balkans. Greece gained Western Thrace, providing a strategic connection to the Aegean Sea and enabling control over important ports like Alexandroupoli, which bolstered its economy and maritime trade capabilities. These territorial acquisitions strengthened Greece’s national unity and identity by incorporating regions with mixed populations and historical significance.

The treaty's provisions placed Greece in a stronger position diplomatically and militarily. By formalizing its borders and integrating these new territories, Greece enhanced its strategic depth and influence in the region. It also received international recognition for its role as an Allied Power in World War I, which furthered its diplomatic credibility. The treaty aligned with Greece’s "Megali Idea"—the national aspiration to expand and unify all Greek-speaking populations under one state.

In terms of military pedagogy and training, the acquisition of new territories and the ongoing tensions with neighboring states emphasized the importance of modernizing and professionalizing the Greek Army. The army had to prepare to defend the expanded borders and manage potential conflicts in regions with mixed ethnic populations. This led to reforms in military education, emphasizing strategic planning, logistics, and integration of modern tactics. Greece’s experience in post-war diplomacy and conflicts, like the subsequent Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922), further highlighted the need for advanced officer training and operational readiness.

The treaty set the stage for Greece’s future goals in diplomacy and defense. It established Greece as a regional power in the Balkans, enabling its participation in broader European affairs. However, the integration of diverse populations and territorial ambitions required careful governance, military vigilance, and strategic diplomacy to sustain long-term gains and stability in a volatile region.

### **4.3 "Toward the 'Megali Idea': The Treaty of Sèvres and Greek Expansionism"**

During the post-Balkan Wars period (1912–1913), successive Young Turk governments sought to address the ethnic composition of the Ottoman Empire by forcibly removing indigenous populations from their ancestral lands. Their goal was the Turkification of the empire, achieved by

eliminating national Christian minorities such as Armenians, Pontians, and other Greek populations. By the end of World War I, approximately 40% of the Hellenic population in the Ottoman Empire had been displaced, and the number of Greek victims approached one million (Collective work, 2012).

The Treaty of Neuilly primarily addressed Bulgaria, a member of the Central Powers, by imposing territorial losses, reparations, and military restrictions. Greece benefited by gaining control of Western Thrace, although its formal incorporation required subsequent treaties. This success encouraged Greece to pursue further territorial expansions aligned with the “Megali Idea”—the national vision of uniting all Greek-speaking populations under a single state. The weakening of Bulgaria removed a significant regional rival, allowing Greece to focus its attention on the collapsing Ottoman Empire.

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire, as an ally of the Central Powers, suffered severe defeats and internal disintegration. The Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918) effectively ended Ottoman participation in the war, leaving its territories vulnerable to Allied partition. In the post-armistice period, the remaining Greek populations in Ottoman lands continued to live in significant insecurity (Collective work, 2012).

To address this, the Entente Powers authorized the Greek government to deploy troops to Smyrna (Izmir) in May 1919 to protect local populations. This military occupation was later formalized by specific provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), further advancing Greece’s territorial ambitions in alignment with the Megali Idea.

Greece, as an Allied power, saw an opportunity to advance claims on Thrace, Smyrna (Izmir), and Constantinople, regions historically and culturally significant to Greek nationalism. Greece’s Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, played a key diplomatic role, aligning Greece closely with the Allied Powers, particularly Britain and France. Venizelos emphasized Greece’s contributions to the war effort and presented claims for territorial expansions at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) and subsequent negotiations. The Allies sought to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and redistribute its territories among themselves and regional powers. Greece’s claims were bolstered by Allied recognition of its historical and cultural ties to Asia Minor and Thrace, as well as its role in securing regional stability. The Treaty of Neuilly, which resolved territorial issues with Bulgaria, paved the way for Greece to focus on its eastern ambitions, particularly in the Ottoman Empire.

In May 1919, with Allied approval, Greek forces landed in Smyrna (Izmir) under the pretext of protecting local Christian minorities from persecution. This occupation marked the beginning of Greece’s direct involvement in Asia Minor and demonstrated its readiness to expand territorial control, pending a formal treaty. The Treaty of Sèvres was negotiated as part of the broader Allied settlement with the Ottoman Empire. It reflected the Allies’ intention to partition Ottoman territories and establish mandates or grant territories to regional powers. Greece’s claims were supported by Venizelos, who skillfully argued for the incorporation of Smyrna, Eastern Thrace, and control of key Aegean islands as part of the settlement (Kyriakidis, 2021).

The Treaty of Sèvres comprises 13 parts with a total of 433 articles:

Part A (Articles 1–26) concerned the Agreement on the League of Nations.

Part B (Articles 27–35) defined the borders of Turkey.

Part C included various sections:

Section A (Article 36) discussed Constantinople.

Section B (Articles 37–61) dealt with the Dardanelles Straits.

Section C (Articles 62–64) covered Kurdistan.

Section D (Articles 65–83) discussed Smyrna.

Section E (Articles 84–87) focused on Greece.

Section F (Articles 88–93) concerned Armenia.

Section G (Articles 94–97) addressed Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine.

Section H (Articles 98–100) concerned Edzali.

Section I (Articles 101–117) dealt with Egypt, Sudan, and Cyprus.

Section I (Articles 118–120) covered Morocco and Tunisia.

Section 1A (Articles 121–122) concerned Libya and the Aegean Islands.

Section IB (Articles 123–131) dealt with nationality, while Section IC (Articles 132–139) contained general provisions.

Part D (Articles 140–151) discussed the protection of minorities.

Part E outlined military, naval, and air terms:

Section A (Chapters A–F) covered general terms, officers of the Ottoman military force, recruitment, schools, arms and ammunition, fortifications, and the preservation of the freedom of the Straits.

Section B (Articles 181–190) addressed naval terms.

Section C (Articles 191–195) set out the conditions for military and naval aviation.

Section D (Articles 196–205) spoke of inter-allied control committees.

Section E (Articles 206–207) provided general provisions.

Part F (Section A: Articles 208–217) dealt with prisoners of war, and Section B (Articles 218–225) focused on graves of the dead.

Part G (Articles 226–230) set out punishments for non-compliance.

Part H (Articles 231–260) addressed financial conditions.

Part I (Articles 261–317) dealt with economic terms, including commercial relations, treaties, industrial property, property rights, contracts, and other general provisions.

Part I (Articles 318–327) addressed aviation.

Part IA covered ports, waterways, and railway stations:

Articles 328–333 dealt with general provisions.

Part B focused on shipping (Articles 334–352), covering topics such as freedom of navigation, ports of international interest, and the conditions for recognizing certain states for port use.

Section C covered railways (Articles 353–362), with specifics on international transport, rolling stock, and transfer of railway lines.

Section D addressed various matters, including waters (Article 363), telegraphs (Articles 364–365), submarine cables (Articles 366–367), enforcement measures (Article 368), dispute adjudication (Articles 369–371), and special provisions (Articles 372–373).

Part IB addressed labor:

Chapter A (Articles 374–386) discussed organization.

Chapter B (Articles 387–407) focused on functioning.

Chapter C (Articles 408–410) provided general provisions.

Chapter D (Articles 411–413) covered transitional measures.

Section B (Article 414) referred to general principles.

Part C (Articles 415–433) included various terms.

According to this treaty, Greece acquired Eastern Thrace, up to Chatalja (just outside Constantinople) (Articles 27 & 86), and formally secured the islands of the eastern Aegean (Lemnos, Samothrace, Chios, Lesbos, Samos, Ikaria, Fourni), but not the Dodecanese, which were under Italian occupation (Article 84). Imbros and Tenedos came under Greek sovereignty (Article 84). For Smyrna, it was stipulated that the region would be under Greek administration for five years (Article 70). After this period, a referendum would be held to decide its future (Article 83). Constantinople was designated to be under the control of the Sultan with free trade (Article 36). Article 26 stipulated that if the Ottoman authorities did not consent to its implementation, they would lose their sovereignty over Constantinople, which could then be occupied by Greece - a scenario that Venizelos promoted through his diplomatic efforts.

The treaty also ensured free navigation and aviation in the Straits, Bosphorus, and Dardanelles (Articles 37–39 & 334). Allied zones of economic influence were created: the French in Cilicia, the Italians in southwestern Asia Minor, and the British in Mosul (Article 101). New states were created under direct or indirect Allied control (Articles 62–139). Finally, for Turkey, "appointments" (contracts of special privileges) were maintained (Articles 261–317). At the same time, Northern Epirus was incorporated into Greece through the secret Venizelos-Tittoni Pact, while Italy agreed to cede the Dodecanese (except Rhodes and Kastellorizo) to Greece. When Britain ceded Cyprus to Greece, a referendum was to be held on these islands to determine if they would be incorporated into Greece. The agreement was later canceled by Italy in 1922.

It is evident that the Treaty of Sèvres was a national triumph for Greece, advancing the vision of the Megali Idea, but the triumph was temporary. The treaty increased Greece's territory by 25%, to 150,833 km<sup>2</sup>, excluding Smyrna, and its population rose to over 5.5 million (an increase of 17%). Venizelos' foreign policy was vindicated. However, the Treaty of Sèvres was described as "more fragile than porcelain." While it was signed by the Sultan's government, the real power was held by Kemal. On April 24, 1920, the Grand National Assembly took place in Ankara: Kemal called the Turks to war to overturn the Treaty of Sèvres. The Greek leadership underestimated the ability of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to rally Turkish nationalists. Atatürk's effective use of propaganda and his ability to unify disparate Turkish factions proved decisive.

#### **4.4 "The Collapse of the Asia Minor Campaign and the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1919-1922)"**

The Treaty of Sevres was not to survive. Earlier, Turkey, and later Italy in 1922, formally ignored their obligations and the terms concerning Greece. Four months before the signing of the treaty, anti-regime forces under Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) overthrew the Sultan, declared democracy in the

country, moved the capital to Ankara, and began the criminal persecution of Greeks and Armenians (Collective work, 2012).

The Treaty of Sevres was never to survive; it was never implemented due to Turkish resistance and shifting geopolitical dynamics. Several momentous events led to its non-implementation, including the collapse of the Great Idea with the failure of the Asia Minor campaign and the disaster that followed.

Venizelos, at the height of his fame and glory, having expanded the boundaries of Greece and inspired every Greek heart with the vision of the Great Idea, mistakenly called early elections, confident of his victory. Prior to this, on 30 July / 12 August 1920, he was the target of an assassination attempt by disgraced officers Lieutenant Apostolos Tserepis and Lieutenant George Kyriakis at the railway station in Lyon. He was injured in the arm and shoulder but attributed the attempt simply to his political opponents, the royalists, who had caused the national division. On August 25, 1920, he received approval from the Great Powers and the Greek people. Anticipating new conflicts with the nationalist Turkey of Kemal Atatürk, and in order to continue his work undaunted, he called elections, believing his victory to be certain.

In the meantime, another unfortunate event occurred. On October 12, 1920, King Alexander I of Greece died from septicemia caused by a bite from a "macaque" monkey. Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis was appointed Regent as a temporary solution. Before Greece's entry into World War I, King Alexander I had replaced his pro-German father, Constantine I, a political rival of Venizelos, responsible for the national division and disliked by the Great Powers. His death required an immediate solution for the crown.

On November 1, 1920, the election results proved Venizelos wrong, and he was soundly defeated (Vassiliou, 2016). Venizelos and his Liberal party won only 118 seats, meaning he did not even become a member of parliament. The rival pro-royalist party, the United State, won 251 seats.

The main reasons for Venizelos' defeat were the fatigue from constant wars (Balkan Wars, conscription in 1915, participation in World War I, Macedonian Front 1917-1918, campaign in Ukraine, and the Asia Minor campaign in 1919), which lacked a clear timetable of operations. The majority of the conscripts were peasants with meagre incomes, eager to return home. The United Opposition ran on the slogan of demobilization, and local United State party leaders preached to prospective voters that the soldiers would be demobilized and return home. On the other hand, an Allied blockade in 1916-1917, aimed at forcing King Constantine to withdraw, caused starvation and deaths, leading to the popular perception of Venizelos as a mouthpiece for the Foreign Powers.

At the same time, the persecution of anti-Venizelists (imprisonment, exile, executions), Venizelos' absence abroad on national issues, and the arbitrary acts and mismanagement at home by moderate anti-Venizelist cadres caused, without Venizelos' knowledge, anger among the Greek people. Venizelos had no time to address the country's domestic affairs because the term of the Lazarus Parliament had expired in 1919. He had promised that after the signing of the Peace Treaties, elections would be held, and the opposing party was pressing for them.

In 1919, the Greek army had been pushed forward to the Asia Minor front with the blessing of the Great Powers, since the Greek leadership, led by the Anglophile Venizelos, had the support of the Allies. However, after his defeat in 1920, the attitude of the Great Powers changed. On November 7/20, 1920, the Entente issued a communiqué warning that if King Constantine I was restored, relations between Greece and the Allies would be unfavorable for the future. France, in particular, was negative about the restoration of Constantine, using it as a pretext to open up Franco-Kemalist relations (with the withdrawal of French troops from Cilicia). It sent a separate notice/warning to

the Rallis government. Similar statements, indicating a pro-Kemalist approach, were made by Italy, while England took a moderate stance. The "United Opposition," or the People's Party with Rallis' government, blinded by empathy for the Venizelists, failed to realize that the reinstatement of King Constantine would strain relations with the Allies and risk the already fragile Treaty of Sevres.

On November 22, 1920, a fake referendum was held on the restoration of King Constantine. The results of the referendum revealed unprecedented fraud: 99% supposedly voted for the restoration of Constantine I and 1% against. Venizelos' party, the Liberals, abstained from the referendum. It was clear that the referendum was unnecessary, as the return of Constantine was a foregone conclusion, as stated by the leader of the Liberals, P. Daglis. The holding of the referendum was intended to show "maximum popular consensus." As a result, on December 6, 1920, King Constantine returned to Athens. The reaction of the Great Powers was immediate. They withdrew support for the costs of issuing a new banknote (1917) in Greece and immediately expressed a willingness to revise the Treaty of Sevres. In vain, the Rallis government sought to implement the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, but now without allies.

On January 2, 1921, the Conference of the Allies for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres took place in Paris. On February 21, 1921, at the London Conference, the Allies (France and Italy) completely turned in favor of Kemal, whose side was invited as an equal member of the victors, unlike Greece, which was allowed to attend only as a spectator (Bierstadt, 1924). France and Italy blatantly violated the Treaty of Sevres, and throughout the Conference, agreements were made with Kemal for the sale of arms in exchange for economic and commercial concessions (Bierstadt, 1924). England continued to maintain a moderate position, while Italy supported the return of Smyrna and East Smyrna territories, as well as Thrace to Turkey.

Dimitrios Gounaris, the founder of the People's Party and a fanatical anti-Venizelist, decided to take up armed struggle and march toward Eski Shehir and Afion Karahisar, despite having promised his voters he would retire before the elections. The decision to march on Ankara placed immense strain on Greek logistics and manpower. Operating far from supply bases, the Greek army struggled to sustain its campaign. The decision to march on Ankara, rather than consolidating gains and seeking a negotiated settlement, proved disastrous.

On March 16, 1921, Kemal diplomatically signed the Treaty of Moscow with the Soviet Union. This was a "Pact of Friendship and Cooperation" with Russian techno-economic assistance. This was preceded by the Treaty of Alexandropol on November 19, 1920, which concerned the division of Armenian territories and common Russian-Turkish borders (Bierstadt, 1924). Venizelos saw a military and diplomatic stalemate and considered the best solution to be a compromise with what could be salvaged. He was not listened to. England saw the danger of the restoration of the Ottoman Empire under a new Kemalist form and did not prevent the situation. On May 29, 1921, King Constantine II visited the Asia Minor Front to encourage the troops. The Greek army advanced with deadly battles at Eski Shehir, Kutahia, and Afion Karahisar but failed to pursue the retreating Kemalist army. On August 31, 1921, the Battle of Sagari took place just outside Ankara, in the heart of Turkish territory (HRH Prince Andrew of Greece and Denmark, 1930). There, the Greek strategy was mistakenly changed from offensive to defensive. The Greek army, far from its supply bases, remained stationary in the desert, giving the Kemalist army valuable time to reorganize and forge alliances.

On October 7, 1921, the Treaty of Ankara was signed between France and Turkey. Its goal was to supply Kemal with French arms and to organize the Kemalist gendarmerie with French support (Bierstadt, 1924). On the other hand, the Greek army could not be maintained and became an economic burden for the pro-royalist Gounaris government. Gounaris' attempt to obtain a loan

failed, as the economic blockade of Greece continued due to the change in attitude of the Great Powers following the restoration of King Constantine II. The army on the Asia Minor front had been dangerously weakened, and much of it was moved away from Constantinople, dismantling Greece's defense. The stagnation of the remaining Greek army for a year on the line of Eski Shehir-Kyutahia-Afion Karahisar caused a climate of defeatism among the troops and a lack of initiative. In contrast, it boosted the morale of the Kemalist army (Kyriakidis, 2021).

British Prime Minister Lloyd George, in a speech in the House of Commons on July 22, 1922, supported the Greek position and warned of the danger to Asia Minor Hellenism, although he failed to convince his country, or the French and Italians.

As a result, on August 13, 1922, the reorganized Kemalist army, backed by the Great Powers, attacked Afion Karahisar. The unprepared and weakened Greek troops retreated in disorder, abandoning valuable military equipment. The French and Italians, eager for profits, continually supplied the Kemalist army. On August 27, 1922, a day of anguish for the Greek population of Asia Minor, the Kemalist army entered Smyrna, indiscriminately destroying the civilian Greeks. On August 31, 1922, the burning of Smyrna began. The Greek and Armenian quarters were destroyed, while many consulates of European countries and the Turkish and Jewish quarters were spared (Kyriakidis, 2021). Attempts were made for Greeks to flee from the western coast and the northwestern side (Panormos Kyzikos, Kios). Those who managed to escape boarded anchored ships and sailed to Greece. Others were slaughtered. Thousands of Greeks, aged 18-45, were sent to "Labor Battalions" in the interior of Asia Minor, where they died in miserable conditions. The historical Hellenism of Asia Minor was completely uprooted (Collective work, 2012). The refugee experience was just beginning.

#### **4.5 The Treaty of Lausanne (1923)**

In 1923, Greece found itself militarily defeated, politically divided, economically devastated, internationally isolated, and threatened by neighboring countries (Bulgaria, Albania, Italy). It was unprotected by European powers and obligated to resettle over 1,200,000 refugees. Yugoslavia and Romania made various claims, while Turkey psychologically wore down Greece. Greece's aim was now to preserve its territories.

On January 30, 1923, the Lausanne Convention was signed as an urgent, special convention for the exchange of populations. This convention, which was compulsory, concerned exclusively the exchange of populations and their property. It included 19 articles and one protocol. The Muslims of Western Thrace, who would remain citizens of the Greek state as a religious minority, and the Greeks of Constantinople (Article 2), Imbros, and Tenedos (Article 14, Section 1), who would remain citizens of a Greek minority on Turkish territory, were excluded. The Convention was incorporated into the later Treaty of Lausanne.

The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 27, 1923 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 1923), replaced the unratified Treaty of Sèvres. It included 143 articles, 5 associated conventions, 4 declarations, 6 protocols, an agreement, and various explanatory documents. It marked the formal end of the Greco-Turkish War and established the modern borders of Turkey. The treaty represented a significant diplomatic victory for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish nationalists, while it was a humiliating defeat for Greece. It marked a breakthrough in Greek foreign policy, ending irredentist aims.

In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, Part A, Article 1 outlined the political conditions for the restoration of peace between England, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serbo-Slovenian state, and Turkey.



Section A, Article 2 mentioned the territorial conditions, outlining the borders of Turkey with Bulgaria and Greece. Eastern Thrace became Turkish, although it had been occupied by the Greek army, while Western Thrace became Greek, with the Evros River as its geographical boundary.

Article 3 outlined Turkey's borders with Syria and Iraq.

Article 4 concerned an annexed 1/1,000,000 scale map with priority text.

Article 5 concerned the border demarcation commission between Greece and Turkey.

Article 6 clarified the terms for the boundary line, including maritime boundaries and islands less than 3 nautical miles from the coast.

Article 7 stipulated that the States concerned should provide any necessary documentation to assist the Boundary Commission.

Article 8 required the States concerned to offer appropriate logistical and technical means.

Article 9 required the States concerned to respect the decisions of the Commission.

Article 10 stipulated that landmarks should be visibly spaced, numbered, and recorded on a map.

Article 11 specified that copies of the Treaty should be forwarded to the States concerned.

Article 12 ratified previous treaties concerning the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the eastern Mediterranean, except for Imbros, Tenedos, and the Lagos Islands (Maurya), particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, which were ratified without prejudice to the present Treaty. The Dodecanese islands were ratified as part of Italy. It was provided that any island within three miles of the Asiatic coast would be subject to Turkish sovereignty.

Article 13 stipulated Greece's obligation not to establish naval bases or fortifications on the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, to prohibit Greek military aviation on these islands, and to limit Greek military forces on these islands to the usual number of those called up for military service, with training permitted. A gendarmerie and police force, proportional to the population of Greek territory, was also permitted.

Article 14 designated the islands of Imbros and Tenedos as Turkish, guaranteeing the safety of their non-Muslim populations. The populations of these islands were excluded from the population exchange under the Lausanne Convention.

Article 15 stipulated that Turkey renounced all rights and titles in favor of Italy over the Dodecanese islands (including Astypalaea, Rhodes, Halki, Karpathos, Kassos, Tilos, Nisyros, Kalymnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsi, Kos) together with their dependent islands and the island of Kastellorizo.

Article 16 stipulated that Turkey renounced all other territorial rights on land or sea except those defined in the Treaty.

Article 17 ratified Turkey's renunciation of Egypt and Sudan as of November 5, 1914.

Article 18 provided for Turkey's discharge of loans related to Egypt.

Article 19 provided for future agreements concerning Egypt.

Article 20 recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus from November 5, 1914.

Article 21 stipulated that Turkish residents of Cyprus had the right to acquire British citizenship.

Article 22 stipulated Turkey's renunciation of all sovereign rights in Libya under the Treaty of Lausanne of October 18, 1912.

In the same Section A, Section 2 laid down special provisions.

Article 23 provided for freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Bosphorus in peacetime.

Article 24 stipulated that the Convention on the status of Article 2 of the present Treaty should have absolute effect.

Article 25 stipulated Turkey's obligation to comply with this Treaty and previous ratified treaties concerning the boundaries and rights of the countries of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

Article 26 stipulated that Turkey accepted the frontiers of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, and Czechoslovakia.

Article 27 defined Turkey's rights exclusively within Turkish territory.

Article 28 provided for the abolition of tariffs in Turkey.

Article 29 defined the rights of French, Libyan, Tunisian, and Turkish Moroccan nationals according to their place of residence.

In Section B, Articles 30 to 36 contained provisions on citizenship and the rights of citizens according to their age.

In Section C, Articles 37-45 contained provisions on the protection of minorities, their rights, and freedom of religion.

In Part B, Section A, Articles 46-57 outlined provisions on the Ottoman public debt, created from the Balkan Wars and Conventions with reference to Articles 50, 51, and 53.

Section B, Article 58 stipulated the mutual waiver by Turkey and the Contracting Powers of any monetary claims for the loss of territory, with Greece excluded.

Article 59 stipulated Greece's obligation to repair damages caused by the Greek army in Anatolia, contrary to the laws of war. In the same article, Turkey renounced any claim against Greece for reparations.

Article 60 stipulated that the States that had seceded from the Ottoman Empire as a result of previous wars and under the present Treaty would acquire, without consideration, all Ottoman property on their territory.

Articles 61-63 laid down general provisions for pensioners, transfers of rights, and debts.

In Part C, Section A, Articles 64-72 laid down provisions for property, rights, and interests in the ceded and non-ceded territories of Turkey, providing for mutual compensation for the countries concerned.

Section B, Articles 73-83 set out provisions on contracts relating to immovable property (leases, mortgages, insurance policies, alienation) and limitation periods.

Section C, Articles 84-85 contained provisions on outstanding debts.

Section D, Articles 86-91 contained provisions on industrial, intellectual, and artistic property.

Section E, Articles 92-98 contained provisions for the establishment of a Joint Arbitral Tribunal and its powers.

Section F, Articles 99-100 contained provisions for the restoration of the Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements of an economic and technical nature which had been concluded with the Ottoman Empire.

Part D, Section A, Articles 101-113 set out provisions on transport (economic contracts for transport of goods and acquired rights), and Section B, Articles 114-118 set out provisions on sanitary matters.

In Part E, Section A, Articles 119-136 set out various provisions on prisoners of war and graves.

Articles 137-142 laid down general provisions on compensation for the occupation of sites in Constantinople, amnesty, archives, and the validity of the Convention on the Exchange of Populations.

Article 143 laid down the provisions for the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne.

It is obvious that the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) established the territorial regime in the Balkans and the balance of power in the southern Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. The creation of a national Turkish state and the shrinking of Hellenism within the boundaries of Greek territory was confirmed. Greek territories with a purely Greek population for over 3,000 years were permanently lost. Greek foreign policy after the Treaty of Lausanne was restricted, with no possibility of maneuver. On October 30, 1930, with the "Greek-Turkish Pact of Friendship and Cooperation," all the pending issues of the Lausanne Convention concerning the property of the exchangeable persons were finally resolved. This pact marked the swan song of Venizelos and the hopes of the refugees for repatriation.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

The period from 1913 to 1923, encompassing the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the shifting tides of global diplomacy, marked a transformative era in the history of Greece. The analysis of key treaties—namely, the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)—provides an in-depth view of how the Greek military evolved, how military pedagogy adapted to new political realities, and how the interplay of diplomacy and military power influenced the trajectory of Greece during the early 20th century. The evolution of military education in Greece during this period was closely tied to national aspirations and the strategic needs of the Greek state. Following the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, which ended the Second Balkan War and consolidated Greece's territorial gains, there was a shift in the way the Greek military envisioned its role within the context of European geopolitics. The outcome of the Balkan Wars had shown the importance of a modernized army, but the complexities of Greek military pedagogy and strategy became even more pronounced during the interwar period.

The aftermath of the First World War exposed the Greek army to the evolving doctrines of warfare, particularly the influence of European powers like France, Britain, and Italy. Military education in Greece began to incorporate new pedagogical approaches, which emphasized not only tactical and operational proficiency but also the development of military diplomacy. This focus was largely due to the growing recognition that military strength alone could not guarantee national security; instead, diplomatic relations and alliances were crucial in navigating the broader European balance of power.

The influence of Venizelism during this period—culminating in the Treaty of Sèvres—further reinforced the importance of diplomacy in Greek military pedagogy. Under Venizelos, Greece's leadership sought to align more closely with Western powers, particularly France, viewing their support as vital in shaping the future of the Greek army. In this context, military education was reshaped not just to produce combat-ready officers but to create diplomats capable of understanding and engaging with the complexities of international relations.

The Greek army during this period underwent significant changes, both in its size and its strategic orientation. The Treaty of Neuilly in 1919, which saw Greece's territorial expansion at the expense of Bulgaria, provided a brief moment of military triumph. The acquisition of new lands necessitated the expansion of the military, particularly the establishment of garrisons and the integration of newly recruited soldiers into the army's ranks. However, this expansion also highlighted the growing strain on Greece's military resources and manpower. The military had to grapple with the complexities of controlling an expanded territory, with new borderlines and diverse populations.

The Greek military also faced significant challenges during the interwar period due to the shifting political dynamics within the country. The downfall of Venizelos, the return of King Constantine I, and the impact of the Great Powers' shifting interests significantly weakened Greece's military position. Constantine I's reign, which was characterized by a pro-German stance during the First World War, led to strained relations with the Allied powers, undermining Greece's diplomatic standing and military prospects.

The return of Constantine I and the subsequent loss of the Asia Minor Campaign (1919-1922) was a pivotal moment for the Greek army. The failure of the military to secure its objectives in Asia Minor led to a catastrophic defeat and the eventual collapse of Greek military aspirations in the region. This military defeat not only highlighted the inadequacy of Greek military preparedness but also exposed the limits of military diplomacy in securing national interests without a coherent and unified strategy.

The military's role in the collapse of the Asia Minor Campaign serves as a stark reminder of the importance of internal cohesion and the alignment of military strategy with national policy. The military's failure to adapt to changing circumstances, both on the battlefield and within the political arena, marked a significant shift in Greek military thinking in the aftermath of the defeat.

Military diplomacy, which had gained prominence during Venizelos' tenure, continued to play a key role in shaping the Greek army's future. The Treaty of Sèvres, although never fully implemented, represented the high point of Greek aspirations in Asia Minor. The promise of territorial expansion and strategic alignment with the Great Powers suggested that military diplomacy was critical to Greece's ambitions. However, the defeat of Venizelos in the elections, the return of Constantine I and the eventual collapse of the Asia Minor Campaign highlighted the fragility of military diplomacy in the face of political instability and international rivalries.

The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres, marked a significant shift in Greek diplomacy. The treaty, which formalized Greece's territorial boundaries and recognized its sovereignty over its post-Balkan War gains, represented a recalibration of Greek military and diplomatic strategy. The loss of Asia Minor and the population exchanges mandated by the treaty forced Greece to reconsider its military priorities. Greece could no longer rely on aggressive expansionism and had to focus on consolidating its territories and ensuring internal stability.

In the aftermath of these treaties, Greek military pedagogy evolved to place a greater emphasis on defensive strategies and the importance of national cohesion. The Greek military would no longer seek to expand through foreign intervention or military campaigns, but instead, its education system

would focus on defense, modernizing tactics, and fostering resilience. This shift was in response to the realization that military power alone was insufficient to secure national objectives without diplomatic leverage and political stability.

The analysis of military education, military diplomacy, and the evolution of the Greek army between 1913 and 1923 underscores the importance of integrating military strategy with national and international political considerations. While Greece's military underwent significant transformations during this period, it became increasingly evident that military strength alone could not secure Greece's long-term future. The interplay between military education, diplomacy, and the evolving geopolitical landscape shaped the trajectory of Greece's army, offering valuable lessons for future generations.

The failure of the Greek military in Asia Minor and the subsequent reorientation of Greece's foreign policy following the Treaty of Lausanne illustrate the challenges of balancing military ambitions with diplomatic realities. As Greece moved into the interwar period, the emphasis would need to be placed not just on military might, but on the integration of military diplomacy, national unity, and strategic vision, ensuring that future military pedagogy would align with the broader needs of the Greek state.

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